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Scientific Self-Fashioning after Frankenstein: The afterlives of Shelley’s novel in 
Victorian sciences and medicine 
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In his polemical 1867 essay against spiritualism the influential Victorian physicist John 
Tyndall angrily rebuked the spiritualists’ tactic of asking audiences to set aside logic and 
reason in favour of mere trust. In “calling upon this agency [trust]”, Tyndall fumed, “he acts 
the part of Frankenstein. It is a monster thus evoked that we see stalking abroad, in the 
degrading spiritualistic phenomena of the present day.” (1871, 48)1 Tyndall’s metaphoric use 
of Shelley’s novel is both precise and damaging. He compares the spiritualist to Victor 
Frankenstein and spiritualism itself to his monstrous creation. In doing this he aims to create 
a powerful analogy that will undermine the integrity of the spiritualist while revealing the 
monstrous, unnatural and dangerous potential of spiritualism in Victorian culture. 
Nevertheless, what is interesting about this example is not how and to what end Frankenstein 
is employed as a rhetorical weapon, but the very fact of its use by a scientific figure like 
Tyndall. For present-day scientists, both in general commentaries and specific scholarship, 
Frankenstein is activated as a metaphor by particular interest groups against science, not used 
by scientists themselves. 
 Indeed present-day scientists writing across various media take up a position of 
passive victimhood when addressing the uses to which Frankenstein is put in representations 
of scientific activity and character. Metaphors of Shelley’s novel are continuously wrought at 
sites external to science and medicine and are consistently projected (often with vicious 
intent) towards sites of science and medicine. In this scenario, scientists seek to avoid being 
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hit by these missiles, but are nevertheless often struck by them.. Robert Schwartz’s 1999 
review of a work of literary-historical scholarship on the Frankenstein mythology is 
exemplary. Writing in the New England Journal of Medicine, Schwartz concluded  
In my view, Frankenstein’s creature is emblematic of superstition and ignorance 
about biomedical science. Almost every substantial advance in the field, from tissue 
culture to transplantation, and now cloning, has been misunderstood by ethicists and 
policy makers with little understanding of science, by a public ignorant of the 
fundamentals of biology, and by science writers seeking sensational stories. (1999, 
244)  
Schwartz may be forgiven his view as a Doctor of Medicine. His argument, after all, is 
offered only anecdotally. However, similar conclusions are drawn by research scientists who 
have turned to the methods of science communication to analyse the role played by Shelley’s 
novel in defining present-day scientific communities for and to public audiences. In their 
article on the significance of Frankenstein for engineers Peter Nagy, Ruth Wyle, Joey 
Eschrich and Ed Finn argue that the “Frankensteinian stigma” has shaped scientists’ self-
representation to the extent that it requires conscious “debunking” to enable “scientists to 
reshape their professional identities” (2018, 1143). In their argument scientists are under the 
yoke of “people” who use metaphors of Frankenstein (they would say myths) to 
“conceptualize science in terms of warnings against the dangers of excessive ambition” 
(1145). This group of “people” (who are never defined with any precision) additionally use 
Frankenstein “as a framework…to imagine scientists and scientific practices” and 
increasingly they do this so as to “bolster an inherently conservative scientific status quo” 
(1146). People construct these metaphors of Frankenstein because they are fundamentally 
stupid, or as the authors put it, “often lack the knowledge to interpret complex theories and 
concepts” (1151). Nevertheless, the effect upon scientists is to drive them towards self-
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exclusion: devalued and rejected they “may feel that they should stop interacting with 
laypeople in order to avoid public scrutiny and negative reactions to their work” (1151). 
 Humanities scholars are not exempt from taking the same view. In a 2018 editorial in 
Science Magazine, constructed around celebratory articles focussed on the continuing 
significance of Frankenstein at the point of its 200th anniversary, the philosopher Henk van 
den Belt implicated those outside scientific communities when he argued that “researchers, 
especially in the life sciences, are understandably anxious about being tainted with the ‘F-
word’” (137). A similar separation of citizen from scientific communities was also at the core 
of Michael Mulkay’s article on embryo research debates in the 1990s, illuminating a 
perpetuation of the argument that the metaphor-making had roots outside science and 
medicine. As Mulkay saw it in 1996, Frankenstein imagery “was used by non-scientists in 
the press and in Parliament to criticize and condemn research on human embryos” (160). 
Although Mulkay claimed that scientific communities also employed the imagery, it is clear 
that they largely did so to articulate their recognition of the tactics of non-scientific writers, 
thereby reinforcing the belief that its beginnings were to be discovered outside science (160-
63). 
 As Tyndall’s attack on the spiritualists shows, the metaphoric use of Frankenstein can 
be found within scientific communities – and in the kinds of self-generated formulations that 
Tyndall’s sharp analogy so adeptly reveals. Although not recognised now, metaphors of 
Shelley’s novel were commonplace within a variety of scientific communities from the 
decade following the publication of the novel in 1818 and throughout the nineteenth century. 
This continued into the twentieth century. In this article I aim to reveal, categorise and 
analyse the different uses of these metaphors across the Victorian period, when they were 
most common. My focus will be on medical and scientific writing, and always on the writing 
of individual scientists who would identify themselves as part of one or more scientific 
communities. The aim in revealing these lost metaphors of Frankenstein is not only to shed 
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light on an area of scientific writing that has been elided, but to challenge the view – implicit 
throughout the examples above – that scientific communities, and scientists, are somehow 
able to live outside of culture, uninfluenced by those powerful forces of representation to 
which others fall prey. More than this, in revealing that scientists were just as likely as any 
other human actor in Victorian Britain to bring Frankenstein into play, I will show that the 
fashioning of scientific identity was not only constructed by those faceless non-scientific 
“people” but by scientists themselves. Far from passive victims struck by the violent 
metaphors of Frankenstein, scientists were imbricated in a culture of scientific self-
fashioning where the role of Frankenstein or his creature might be one they took on as their 
own or tried to foist upon their colleagues and rivals.2 
 In the four sections to follow I begin by asking why it is that the significance of 
Frankenstein for scientific self-identity has been effaced despite the very extensive scholarly 
work (from many different fields of inquiry) that has been dedicated to examinations of the 
novel and its influence. This is important because it speaks to another form of identity-
formation – the fashioning of Frankenstein as a modern mythology of scientific and cultural 
significance. In the second section I turn to the first of a group of Victorian examples of 
scientific writing that employs Shelley’s novel to give science and the scientist specific 
identity. In this section I place the focus on the human body, showing how metaphors of 
Frankenstein enable scientific writers to articulate a sense of the potentiality of certain 
nineteenth-century sciences and the role they should play in advancing knowledge. The third 
section shifts the focus to scientific conflicts, illuminating the power of the Frankenstein 
metaphor, when used by scientific rivals, to undermine scientific practice or to characterize 
the scientist as unfit for either the successful production of knowledge or to make a positive 
contribution to scientific communities. In the final section I reveal what is the most surprising 
deployment of the metaphor of Frankenstein, at least to the present-day scholarly eye: 
unflinchingly positive metaphors where Victor Frankenstein’s fictional activity is held up as 
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ideal or desirable. In the short conclusion that brings the article to an end, I reflect on the 
significance of scientific self-fashioning with Frankenstein for future scholarship, and point 
towards the potential for other investigations that might extend our understanding of the role 
of imaginative literature in building scientific communities. 
 
 
1. Fashioning Frankenstein 
 
Considering the vast scholarly apparatus that surrounds and supports Shelley’s novel it is 
surprising that its metaphoric appearance in scientific writing has not previously been 
identified and examined. This is especially confounding when considering the extensive 
research on other forms of Frankenstein’s afterlives. In the recent Cambridge Companion to 
Frankenstein, for example, there were four chapters dedicated to considering the influence 
(and ongoing inter-textual existence) of Frankenstein in stage and screen drama, twentieth-
century fiction, and graphic novels. (Smith 2016, 175-89; 190-204;  205-18; 219-40) A year 
or two earlier Lester B. Friedman and Allison B. Kavey had looked closely at a wide range of 
Frankenstein narratives published from soon after the novel and continuing into the twenty-
first century. (2016) It is not, however, the resurgence of interest around the 200th anniversary 
of the novel’s publication that has seen this recognition of the varied and extensive afterlives 
of Frankenstein. In 1990, for example, Steven Earl Forry examined nineteenth-century 
adaptations, revisions, and popular representations of the novel, and particularly its two key 
figures of the scientist and the monster, across a wide range of different media. Most relevant 
to the present discussion is Jon Turney’s excellent reading of the role of Frankenstein in 
informing and deforming debates about the life sciences in popular media and elsewhere 
from the 1930s to the 1990s in his Frankenstein’s Footsteps. (1998)3 Turney does offer 
examples of scientists employing Frankenstein to discuss their science (or science generally) 
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but these are not specifically self-generated metaphoric uses; rather they tend to be reactive 
comments to debates already in existence in other narrative forms.4 
 This recognition of Frankenstein’s fecundity for reinterpretation and multiplicity in 
subsequent narratives has been generative for scholarship. At the same time, research 
conducted in the main by scholars of literature and culture has unconsciously fixed the 
metaphoric use of Frankenstein within certain spheres. These have unhelpfully replicated the 
very patterns of science’s relation to culture that was apparent in the earlier examples I gave 
of scientific victimisation. Roslynn D. Haynes, whose work has been so important in 
revealing the long history of the literary representation of the scientist, offers an archetypical 
argument in this respect. In a 2016 article, asking specifically why Frankenstein has 
remained such a potent symbol of the scientist, she focussed on what she called the “rich 
counter-culture produced by non-scientists” (32). She did so, because, in her view, the stories 
science told of itself were self-congratulatory, and therefore false “grand narratives” that 
revealed only the “hegemonic power of the scientific establishment” (33). By contrast 
Frankenstein was a narrative taken up by reformist non-scientific groups whose cultural 
perspectives on science were more accurate. Not only is there the ongoing and silent 
separation of science from culture in this argument, there is also an entirely inaccurate 
creation of an opposition between a homogenous, conservative scientific establishment and 
liberal, truth-telling sets of artistic cultures. This unhelpful dichotomy constructs a very 
particular role for Frankenstein: as an object for and useful only to cultural commentators 
and within artistic practice. It is not only useless (since false) to ask what science might do 
with the novel, it is unthinkable. The failure to imagine that the disciplines of science might 
deploy Frankenstein has been widespread. J. Paul Hunter (2012, ix), in introducing the 
excellent Norton edition of the 1818 text of Frankenstein, noted that the novel “is larger than 
itself, a text that prompts not just close reading but the pursuit of intellectual and cultural 
implication.” Here, the novel may be larger than itself but it is not beyond the limits of 
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literary criticism where close reading is followed by a very fast reduction to the novel’s place 
within cultural milieux.  
Similarly Elizabeth Young (2008, 2), in a wonderful assessment of the novel’s use in 
political life, also privileges culture over science when she argues that “the Frankenstein 
story has a long history of being used as a political metaphor…metaphors matter to culture 
and thought”. Metaphors also matter to science, of course, but their silencing is the inevitable 
result of an unconscious acceptance that culture is not associated with science while it is an 
essential feature of the praxis of the novel. The most egregious version of the elite culture 
boundary constructed around Frankenstein is that kind of reading that attempts to create a 
form of feedback loop into scientific communities by employing the novel bluntly as a 
cultural tool for the teaching of ethical practices. As H. Davies (2004, 35) demonstrates, 
Frankenstein might be regarded as offering “an illuminating and provocative narrative” for 
ethical study that provides “features that are often absent in the more formal, modern ethical 
analyses.” Having uncovered this value, Davies “propose[s] that IRB [Institutional Research 
Board] or REC [Research Ethics Committee] members could profitably read it to develop 
their understanding” (35). Not only does Frankenstein become the most extraordinary of 
pedagogic cultural documents in such instances, the argument offered here extends, indeed 
exacerbates, the assumed superiority of the artistic narrative of science over scientific 
communities’ self-expression of their practices and histories. In all of these examples, and 
simultaneous with the valuable contribution they make to our understanding of the novel’s 
powerful metaphoric potential, the sciences slip beneath culture to become hidden by a 
hierarchy of knowledge where they have no purchase. In such a context it becomes entirely 
understandable that the extensive metaphoric use of Frankenstein within scientific 
communities has been ignored. As the next three sections will show, there is much to be 
gained – especially for the relationship between the sciences and the humanities – by 
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bringing to light the vibrant life of these metaphors as they acted upon science and medicine 
in the Victorian period. 
 
 
2. Frankenstein and the Body 
 
Susan Tyler Hitchcock (2007, 114), in her cultural history of Frankenstein, claims with good 
evidence that across the nineteenth century “references to Frankenstein and his monster 
seemed to shift from usage to usage, flinging associations hither and yon.” While this is 
certainly true, too, in scientific and medical writing, there are collections of metaphors that 
coalesce around the same or similar topics. One of those is the body. For many medical 
writers, Frankenstein offered the linguistic and intellectual vocabulary for speaking about the 
relationship between medical practices and the human body. From as early as the 1820s 
medical writers recognised the power of the novel to offer useful metaphors for future 
possibilities in the artificial shaping of the body. In a quite extraordinarily prophetic lecture, 
recorded in the Lancet in November 1828, the obstetrician James Blundell (well-known for 
his own experimental work on the body which led to the first blood transfusion) spoke of the 
potential for learning more about the formation of the foetus, and perhaps reaching a point 
where obstetric scientists would be able to imitate its functions: “We have imitated many 
other of the natural operations, may we then hope to imitate this, even in the humblest 
manner?” (231) At this point in his lecture, Blundell pauses and invokes Shelley’s novel: 
“But I forbear, lest you should take it into your heads that I expect to realise the extravagant 
fiction of the novelist, and bring from the stage Frankenstein, to act his part in the scenes of 
real life” (231).5 Blundell recognises that the manipulation of the human body, to the point at 
which that body becomes a scientific object (or creation), is well represented by drawing a 
comparison to Victor Frankenstein. Within his metaphor Blundell accepts that his speculation 
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on a medical future of this kind is far-fetched and even dangerous – both because of its 
potential to create an unnatural body and the damage that might be caused to his own 
reputation as an obstetric authority for suggesting the possibility. 
 This doubling of meaning that the metaphor of Frankenstein provided Blundell was 
one taken up at other points in the Victorian period by other medical writers. In 1856, an 
anonymous writer to the Lancet on the subject of physiological advances that year contrasted 
the English physiologists with their “continental contemporaries” with the suggestion that 
“our physiologists” are able “to philosophise concerning the mysteries of the nucleus and the 
cell without speculating as to the construction of a Frankenstein-monster” (497). Once again, 
it is implicitly accepted that in discussions of the potential to alter the human body the 
comparison with Frankenstein is a credible one. Indeed, Blundell’s earlier concern is here 
turned into a criticism of non-English physiologists who may, it is intimated, be unable to 
judge, like Victor Frankenstein, the line drawn between acceptable physiological inquiry and 
dangerous speculation. 
 Medical students would not have graduated unaware of the potential for their own 
clinical and scientific practice to be represented as similar to Victor Frankenstein’s scientific 
experimentation. This was precisely because they were dealing with the human body. As 
John Ransome warned in an annual lecture to Cambridge medical students coming to the end 
of their studies in 1869, “there are not a few persons who still think that in seeking to know 
how the animal body is built up, and in imitating some of its actions, we are in danger like 
Frankenstein of constructing a monster, which will ultimately destroy our most precious faith 
in God and in spiritual things” (19). For Ransome, however, and for the students he urges on 
their way, the work of the medical scientist was to “raise another corner of the veil which 
conceals the mysteries of creation” (18). In language clearly reminiscent of the Bridgewater 
Treatises, Ransome considers another metaphor offered by Shelley’s novel: the parallels 
between scientific knowledge and religious belief. Others were more secular. John Ferguson, 
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writing in the same student lecture genre as Ransome in 1877, noted that the anatomist or 
physiologist did not have the advantages of the watchmaker who “studies the construction of 
his machine by taking it to pieces, observing the form, arrangement, reciprocity of its parts” 
(22). It is “only Frankenstein, the anatomist of romance,” joked Ferguson, “who has as yet 
succeeded in doing this with a human machine” (22). Shelley’s novel does not support a 
profound point in this example, but rather enables the lecture’s warmth and humour. Even so, 
the metaphoric significance of Frankenstein – in both Ransome’s and Ferguson’s lectures – 
points to certain potentialities. For both writers the metaphor articulates a sense of 
transgression, albeit against very different formulations of the norm. 
 One of the most richly suggestive examples emerges in a speech made by T.H. 
Huxley in the 1880s, and which was reported in Nature in December 1883. Huxley was 
speaking at the opening of the newly-built Finsbury Technical College in London. This was a 
very similar appointment to his better-known opening of the Mason Science College in 
Birmingham in 1880 where he took the opportunity of a public speech to lambast both the 
teaching of classics and Matthew Arnold’s definition of culture. On this occasion, though, 
Huxley offered an analogy between the construction of a scientific building and Shelley’s 
novel, by thinking about the creation of the Natural History Museum, opened in 1881, and 
other sites of science in South Kensington: 
  
That building was the mere bricks and stones of the Central Institute, and the business 
upon which…he [Huxley] and his colleagues had lately been so largely occupied was 
making a soul for this body. It was an immensely difficult operation, as they were 
always in danger, like Frankenstein in the story, of making something which would 
eventually devour them instead of being useful to them. (“Notes” 1883, 159) 
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Clearly as humorous as Ferguson’s comment to the medical students, Huxley’s danger is in 
part the common concern of the administrator who fears the weight and power of institutional 
bureaucracy. But, in drawing out a metaphoric comparison with Victor Frankenstein, Huxley 
is also offering a critique of the instability of the scientific enterprise. With fascinating insight 
into the novel, Huxley offers an analogy between the soulless or soulful creature and the 
empty or object-filled museum, between an unnatural and artificial body and a complete and 
cohesive new creation. What Huxley’s reading of Shelley tells him is that the creation of a 
“useful” scientific body is in the careful management of speculation leading to the potential 
for new knowledge. Like Blundell before him, Huxley recognises that it is only by walking 
the line (with masculine bravery, inevitably) between success and failure that the line 
becomes tangible. 
 What these metaphors of Frankenstein reveal is that it was from the decade after the 
novel was published that medical scientists believed they were getting closer to achieving at 
least some elements of the novel’s speculative science. Often that is thought to be the case 
only in the later twentieth century. As Kim Hammond argued in 2004, “in the last few 
decades  Frankenstein has become increasingly prominent as Shelley’s fiction moves closer 
to reality” (182). Yet the evidence here shows this was also the view of the Victorians. In that 
belief, two key concerns emerge. First, scientists noted the dangers of manipulating the 
human body as well as the caution that should be employed in doing so. Second, and felt 
equally strongly, was the damage that might be done to the scientists’ body of work: that at 
stake in their activities was not only the body on which they practised but their own 
reputations. In the next section I turn to more dramatic employments of the metaphor – in the 
internecine conflicts between competing scientific and medical groups and individuals. 
 
 
3. Weaponizing Frankenstein 
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As many present-day scientific commentators have already noted, Frankenstein has often 
been invoked to critique specific scientists and particular scientific activities. One of the most 
striking Victorian examples of this is the anti-vivisectionist debate in which Louis Pasteur 
and his experimental methods were widely attacked. It was not, however, only non-scientists 
who employed the metaphor of Frankenstein to develop a perspective on Pasteur and his 
work. In the short “Notes” section of Nature on 3 May 1894, for example, the anonymous 
compiler of recent scientific community activity complained that “if the general public are 
gulled into believing half of what it sees posted on the public hoardings concerning the 
results of the treatment at the Pasteur Institute in Paris, it must liken the eminent head to a 
veritable Frankenstein” (14). While the writer here accuses public agitators of creating a 
particular impression of Pasteur, it is the writer himself who creates the simile with Shelley’s 
protagonist and therefore marks the scientist as Frankenstein while attempting the opposite.6 
 For many Victorian scientists, though, a much more deliberate and conscious 
association of a colleague with Victor Frankenstein and his experiments was a credible piece 
of weaponry in the small-scale internal conflicts that often mark scientific communities. An 
exemplary disagreement among Victorian hospital physicians typifies its usage. In July 1864, 
as the Lancet reported, the physician at a new hospital created for the treatment of stone – 
William Coulson – found himself in conflict with his medical peers over claims he made for 
the poor treatment of the same disease at other hospitals. (Wakley 1864, 74-5)7 
Unsurprisingly, physicians working at these rival institutions were angered by his (false) 
analysis of their operation success rates and survival statistics. Dr William O’Connor, 
physician at the Royal Free Hospital, for example, wrote to the Morning Post to express his 
“surprise and amazement” at Coulson’s claims, and told the Post that at the very moment 
Coulson had made his arguments, he had “immediately…call[ed] into question the accuracy 
of his statements” (74). Raging between various medical men for nearly a month, the conflict 
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itself, as much as Coulson’s original claims, became (albeit briefly) central to medical gossip. 
Responding to this, and very much opposing Coulson’s perspective, James Wakley 
concluded that the Morning Post reporting had “uncovered the FRANKENSTEIN of which 
this incautious young man is (and justly) shocked to find himself the parent” (75). While 
Wakley clearly erodes the difference between Victor Frankenstein and his creature in this 
statement, his capitalized text typographically indicates his replacement of Coulson’s name 
(also capitalized) with that of Shelley’s misguided scientist. Coulson has allowed the debate 
to become monstrous, but has also played the part of the monster’s creator. Blame is 
therefore cast by the metaphoric comparisons to Frankenstein.  
 Other internecine conflicts were also marked by the use of Frankenstein to signal 
misguided effort or perceived misunderstandings of new knowledge. In another Lancet 
editorial, in 1874, James Wakley repeated his use of Frankenstein to condemn the Indian 
sanitary commissioner David Douglas Cunningham’s views on contagion: “Dr. 
CUNNINGHAM spoke of contagion as if it were held to be some self-operative Frankenstein 
giving laws to itself, and, finding, that such is not the case, he holds contagion disproved” 
(482). While it is the conception of contagion that is explicitly compared to Frankenstein, the 
rest of the editorial makes clear comparisons between Cunningham himself – described 
variously as “looming”, “alone among the ruins”, “peculiar”, and “unsparing” (482) – and 
Frankenstein’s creature.8 A similar attribution of Frankenstein was made by the psychologist 
John Charles Bucknill in his Lumleian Lecture on insanity, delivered to the Royal College of 
Physicians in 1878. Concerned by some of his colleagues’ views on the actions of the will in 
mental activity, and the acceptance of their views in legal cases of insanity, Bucknill argued 
that judges should not “needlessly vivify this Frankenstein of a will” (560) created by his 
fellow psychologists. This, too, is an attack at a slant: Bucknill does not explicitly compare 
his own colleagues with Victor Frankenstein or his creature, but instead calls their scientific 
conclusions Frankenstein-like. The meaning here is clearly that they have produced a 
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monstrous body of knowledge that should not be brought to life (or vivified) by being 
accepted in law. In both these examples, the metaphor of Frankenstein illuminates apparently 
poor scientific judgement. It is, though, not simply the case that the metaphor therefore casts 
the scientist as Victor Frankenstein, as might easily be done. Rather, the metaphor collapses 
the scientists and scientific judgement together, so that each takes on the characteristics of 
monstrousness. 
 Questions of judgement were also undermined by comparisons to Frankenstein in 
institutional contexts. Particularly in the medical professions, institutional bodies – regulatory 
and statutory – often came under scrutiny by their members. At times they were seen as 
Frankensteinian. Comparisons began as early as 1829, when Thomas Wakley wrote in 
outrage at the decision of the Commissioner of Stamps to increase the duty payable on 
medicines. Giving examples of chemists who had acted outside the new legal requirements 
and received a summons to court, Wakley wrote that “the sudden appearance of the monster 
in Frankenstein, could not produce greater affright than would be occasioned by the sight of 
such a hideous and ghastly document” (378). A similarly vivid comparison befell the Chief 
Commissioner of Works in the late 1850s, as he battled to improve London’s sanitation 
through engineering better sewerage systems for the river Thames. For the writer of the 
Lancet’s report on these efforts “the Chief Commissioner of Works is much in the position of 
that unfortunate student in Mrs. Shelley’s ‘Frankenstein,’ who, intending to make ‘a faultless 
monster which the world ne’er knew,’ only succeeded in manufacturing an ill-conditioned 
creature that constantly tormented its maker” (“Banks of the Thames” 1858, 94). The writer 
appears to contrast the proposed ideal creature against the evil reality, and the sought-for 
perfect body against its physiologically abject construction. While there is sympathy for the 
Commissioner in this metaphor, the systemic problems, inherently bureaucratic in origin, are 
still made monstrous. A final indicative example reveals that the metaphor was not reserved 
for institutional bodies which exerted external influence on the medical profession, but was 
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also applied to internal structures. An 1864 discussion of the group of pharmacists who had 
been tasked with constructing the “new pharmacopoeia” (“New Pharmacopeia”, 479) saw 
problems in the variability of the weights and measures indicated in the recipes for chemical 
compounds. This lack of uniformity, and consequent lack of authority in the new work, led 
the writer to claim that “like Frankenstein, the Pharmacopoeia is ever pursued by its own 
creation” (479). Here, and in each of these institutional examples, it is the creature rather than 
Victor Frankenstein who plays the most active metaphoric role. Institutional bureaucratic 
decisions are made monstrous. In turn the individual chemist, physician and pharmacist is 
cast as the victimised Victor Frankenstein; over-powered by the size and strength of the 
creature. 
 In weaponizing the Frankenstein metaphor, very different Victor Frankensteins 
emerge. When the institutions of science are criticised Victor is the unfortunate victim of 
error. When individual colleagues are being marked out Victor is the over-bearing madman 
destined for failure. The flexibility of the metaphor is certainly one reason for its continual 
use. It is equally telling, nevertheless, that the creature is exclusively employed in metaphors 
aimed at organisational structures and decision-making. It is a recognition that while Victor is 
singular, the creature is multiple. He is the accumulation of body parts into a whole that 
because it is multiple has the potential to be monstrous. So, too, is the scientific institution a 
constructed body that in its unnatural multiplicity might make a monster of scientific activity. 
Implicit in this perspective, too, is the inevitability of conflict between individual scientists 
and their regulatory structures. As Diana Reese has argued, the monster’s “assemblage and 
animation are depicted as forming an inexorable chain of events that culminate in the 
dramatic encounter of monster and maker” (2006, 49). Seeing the metaphor of Frankenstein 
employed to depict scientific organisations brings to the light the (unconscious) acceptance 
among individual scientists that their own regulations and statutes will eventually be found 
too binding.  
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4. Frankenstein Favoured 
 
In starting now on the third and final set of examples of metaphors, I move from those that 
enable criticism to those that demonstrate a positive reading of the novel and its articulation 
of the scientific enterprise. This seems unlikely in the present context: Frankenstein is 
presently understood as one of the central myths of scientific over-reaching and of the ethical 
vacuum that can present itself in flawed research cultures.9 This is so readily apparent to 
present-day critical audiences that Bernard E. Rollin felt no need to explain it beyond naming 
it as “the Frankenstein syndrome” (1995, title page). For some nineteenth-century scientific 
writers, however, there were ways of drawing comparisons with Frankenstein that reflected 
positively upon the recipient. For example, John Ferguson’s citing of Frankenstein in his 
lecture to students, discussed in the second section above as suggesting transgression, does 
not do so with any real sense of negative consequences. Indeed, Ferguson’s perspective that 
medical science has not “as yet succeeded” (1878, 22) in replicating Victor Frankenstein’s 
ability to put the body together from its constituent parts suggests that doing so may in fact be 
a desirable future benefit of progressive medical knowledge. For Ferguson, these actions are 
to be valued as exemplifying medical potential. He employs the Frankenstein metaphor to 
inspire the next generation of medical professionals rather than to warn them. 
 This reversal of the metaphor and its being put to use in stoking ambition is not a one-
off. The Dominion Medical Monthly, in a humorous note about tonsils, invites its readers to 
imagine the benefits of being able to act as Victor Frankenstein and to construct the human 
frame as one would wish. “A distinguished medical luminary on the other side of the 
Atlantic,” claims the author, “had said that were he, like Frankenstein, to attempt the artificial 
construction of a man, he would leave the tonsils out” (“Tonsils” 1893, 124). They are, 
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reports the author, “a perfectly useless appendage which cumbered the throat” (124). 
Although frivolous and inconsequential in one regard, the article reveals that different 
metaphoric associations were possible. In particular this metaphor looks forward with some 
enjoyment to the possibility of artificial creation for it puts into the hands of the future 
physiologist the potential improvement of the human frame. This latter aspect was a topic 
taken up, with greater seriousness, by George M. Gould and Walter L. Pye in their book on 
medical curiosities, published originally in the USA at the very end of the nineteenth century. 
In an extended discussion of what surgery was able to achieve by way of either enhancing the 
human body or alleviating some of its weaknesses, Gould and Pye turn to recent successes 
with eye surgery: 
 
Hansell and Clark say that the perplexities of learning to see after twenty-six years of 
blindness from congenital disease, as described by a patient of Franke, remind one of 
the experience of Shelley’s Frankenstein. Franke’s patient was successfully operated 
on for congenital double cataract, at twenty-six years of age. The author describes the 
difficulties the patient had of recognising by means of vision the objects he had 
hitherto known through his other senses, and his slowness in learning to estimate 
distances and the comparative size of objects. (Gould and Pye 1900, 268) 
 
On first reading this metaphor looks like a further example of the conflation of Victor 
Frankenstein with his creature. Closer attention reveals an ambiguity. The experience of 
Frankenstein can be applied to the patient/creature but also to the surgeon/Victor who has to 
witness the coming into being of the newly-formed human. It is nevertheless a largely 
positive experience that is described with the metaphor. The emergence of new ways of 
interacting with the world, however difficult they may first appear to be, is a sign of medical 
advancement and human improvement. Equally striking is that none of the common 
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associations of Frankenstein are mobilised in this metaphor. The post-surgery eyes are not 
monstrous, nor is their new-found power overwhelming. Rather, there is a quiet optimism in 
the process of learning that speaks to the positive potential endpoints of acting like 
Frankenstein and seeking to promote new methods for improving the human body and 
alleviating distressing conditions. Neither does this metaphor create a new annex of the 
novel’s original meaning. Victor Frankenstein did, after all, originally claim that his aim in 
undertaking new research was to “banish disease from the human frame” (Shelley 1993, 23).  
 It is important to recognise that the metaphoric use of Frankenstein was not always in 
the gothic mode or staged as a Cassandra-like warning of future disaster. In these favourable 
analogies with the novel’s characters and actions medical scientists revealed a much more 
positive perspective on their future research and its potential to enhance the human condition 
without fear of further and more negative consequences. In such examples these metaphors 
come closer to light-hearted representations from a century later. Jon Cohen sees these as 
using Frankenstein as a shorthand for the “delightfully chimeric” combinations of “disparate 
parts” (2018, 149) in which several scientific studies of the late twentieth century revel. 
Viewing them in combination with those other Victorian metaphors gives a different 
impression. They are, despite their very much more positive reading of Victor Frankenstein’s 
research, similarly focussed on the production of knowledge. While this is obviously 
configured optimistically, it is still epistemological possibility that remains at stake. Indeed, 
these positive representations of Frankenstein reveal just how often all metaphors of 
Frankenstein focus on the fragility of knowledge production. Shelley’s novel, when 
repurposed in scientific writing, may not offer up epistemic crisis – as present-day scientists 
claim is true of popular representations – but they do provide access to an ever-present 
epistemological crisis. That is, the validation of science itself is not at risk, but the ways in 
which scientific knowledge is formed and managed is undoubtedly under investigation. 
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5. Conclusion: Transnational Frankenstein and the Democratic Deficit 
 
Scientific self-fashioning with metaphors of Frankenstein includes the image of individual 
scientists, the nature of scientific institutions and the potential power of new scientific 
knowledge. Each of these speaks to the representation of the ur-scientist; an original type that 
does not exist, and never has existed, but yet which has symbolic power in relation to 
individual types. That is the power of Shelley’s novel – to have managed to be so malleable 
in response to different historical moments that its characterisation of the scientist is almost 
identical with the characterisation of the ur-scientist. And while I have focussed almost 
exclusively on British examples of Frankenstein metaphors this malleability means that there 
are many more to be uncovered across the Anglophone world. In the first part of this 
conclusion I wish to show the extent to which Frankenstein metaphors have travelled 
globally, and yet how they continue to depict concerns with the same themes as I have 
identified here. To do so I will consider briefly select examples from nineteenth-century 
Australian scientific writing. Finally, I will turn to the wider implications in present-day 
science and its communication of the metaphors I have uncovered. For it is absolutely the 
case that the study of these metaphors is revealing of the politics that underpins present 
complaints about the “stigma” (Nagy et al. 2018, 1143) of Frankenstein. 
 Similar to Britain, Australian culture was replete with references to Frankenstein 
across the Victorian period. Commonly, across the popular print media and in political 
commentary, Frankenstein was used metaphorically, and with a clear sense that the metaphor 
would be readily understood by readers and listeners. During the 1891 debate on the 
Commonwealth of Australia Bill, which confederated Australia as a single nation a decade 
later, George Dibbs, representing the colony of New South Wales, argued that the present 
principles of organisation would “create a federal Frankenstein” unless he and his colleagues 
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were able to “lay the foundation first” (n.p.). Dibbs, aiming for persuasive rhetoric, employs 
Frankenstein as a popular, forceful, and readily graspable metaphor for a powerful and 
uncontrollable force. Writing about scientific activity assumed the same common 
recognition. The Sydney-based Freeman’s Journal, reporting on the explosion of a new oil-
based substance called “Nitro-glycerine”, warned against the stoppage of further experiments 
by stating that “No body…would wish to restrain the research and experiments of 
philosophers from any fear lest their inventions or discoveries might possibly turn out 
monsters. The days of Frankensteins, we may hope, are over” (“Bridge Street Explosion” 
1866, 152). The writing here assumes a collective recognition that “Frankensteins” connote 
dangerous science undertaken by immoderate experimenters. In Australian medicine, too, 
Frankenstein was employed, as it had been in British medical and scientific communities, to 
interrogate institutional practices. The Australasian Medical Gazette, for example, was 
concerned by systemic problems of over-recruitment at the University of Sydney’s Medical 
School. This was leading, claimed the writer, to poor graduate physicians who were taking up 
positions as surgeons long before they were skilled enough to do so. (“Medical School” 
1899) “Those who originated and fostered the Medical School of Sydney,” the article 
warned, “little knew the Frankenstein that they were constructing” but which was now 
“contributing towards the creation of a soulless fabric calculated to destroy the medical 
practitioners of New South Wales” (n.p.)10  
 The parallels to the metaphors in British scientific writing are obvious. The 
“Frankenstein” referenced in this article pertains to the creature rather than to Victor. It 
continues the tradition of seeing institutional structures of science as collectives. But the 
metaphor is extended here in interestingly different ways. The Medical School, now as 
Frankenstein’s creature,  is constructing “a soulless fabric” which will destroy the state’s 
medical community. This is yet another monster, the soulless figure bringing destruction on 
the medical family. This extended metaphor draws on both the specific plot of the novel and 
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its symbolic concerns with a new species of monster which might overpower its creators. It 
reveals, in powerful terms, the concern with institutionalised power that many British 
scientists shared with their Australian counterparts.11 
 The concern shown by Victorian scientists for institutional over-reaching and aberrant 
behaviour, combined with their obsession with knowledge production, can shed light on the 
present-day scientific opposition to what Bernard Rollin called “the Frankenstein thing” 
(1995, 5). In Peter Nagy and his colleagues’ view, this “thing” is the perceived stigma of 
being compared to Victor Frankenstein and/or his creature. It is so powerful a metaphor that 
even scientific communities come to believe the stigmatising of their fellow scientists. (2018, 
1143) For those scientists who believe that Frankenstein alters the represention of science for 
public audiences the answer appears to be to develop strategies to devalue its power and 
replace it with “more accurate and favourable public perceptions” (Nagy et al. 2018, 1154). 
But the evidence of Victorian scientific use of the Frankenstein metaphor suggests that it was 
an important tool in keeping a check upon both individual practices and institutional activity. 
More than this, the metaphor enabled some vital thinking about the politics of knowledge 
production and its value. Present-day scientific commentators do not appear to be concerned 
about scientists making use of “the Frankenstein thing”. Their concern is its use by external 
audiences. In attempting to eradicate the power of the Frankenstein metaphor from popular 
usage, scientists may unwittingly (like Victor Frankenstein) be undermining an important 
element that allows science to take its place within society: its acceptance of the principle that 
all democratic citizen have the right to speak freely within the law about science’s aims, 
methods and activities. As Martha Augoustinos and her co-writers have argued, the 
increasing politicization of the sciences “will only intensify the need for inclusive and 
democratic modes of decision-making in science policy” (2010, 112). To advocate for the 
rejection of a mode of public involvement in science, and especially one that draws 
imaginatively on one of culture’s most successful studies of science within the world, is to 
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invite an increasing democratic deficit in public engagement with science. It is also a 
misreading of the novel. Victor Frankenstein was of course an over-reacher whose hubris 
blinded him to the consequences of experimental work. His monster was of course a symbol 
of transgressive science, its monstrosity and its power. But the novel also warns us against 
isolation, and against allowing only the voices we wish to hear enter into our practice. That 
is, it remains an important metaphor for understanding how vital it is to continue to ask 
questions about our production of new knowledge – and at times even to compare that with 
Frankenstein. Victorian scientists knew this, and we would do well to remember their gleeful 
employment of Shelley’s novel as we consider the scientific challenges ahead. 
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1 This article was partly researched and entirely written during a Visiting Fellowship at the Humanities Research 
Centre of the Australian National University. I am indebted to the support, both financial and intellectual, of the 
HRC and of the ANU community more widely. 
2 My term scientific self-fashioning is a conscious amendment of Stephen Greenblatt’s influential work on 
Renaissance self-fashioning, which was the subject of his 1980 book of that title published by the University of 
Chicago Press. Greenblatt showed in that book the influence upon identity that different forms of literature could 
have, which is one of the aims, albeit very specifically focussed on a single fictional text, of the present article. It is 
worth noting that I use the term “scientist” in this context as the majority of examples I employ come from a period 
in the second half of the nineteenth century when that term was in common usage. I recognise, of course, that my 
earlier examples fall in the period when other titles (natural philosopher, man of science, and savant, for example) 
were still more regularly used. My use of a single term is done to ease any complexity in the mixing of terminology. 
3 Additionally interesting, as it is written by a scientist rather than media scholar, is the slightly earlier work by Rollin 
(1995). 
4 There are numerous other examples of the use of Frankenstein focussed on the late twentieth and twenty-first 
century, when the prefix ‘Franken’ came into use, often to describe scientific manipulations of objects perceived as 
natural: Frankenfoods or Frankenbabies, to give two particularly striking examples. There is nothing to be gained by 
my citing an extensive list here, but Hammond (2004) and Stubber and Kirkman (2016), offer two very different 
approaches and include extensive citations to further scholarship. 
5 Blundell’s phrasing makes clear that he is thinking not only of the novel but also its various stage adaptations, 
which had been common in London theatres in the 1820s. 
6 A masculine descriptor seems most appropriate for an anonymous author in Nature, considering the gender 
imbalance of its overall authorship. 
7 Stone is the generic term for a range of conditions such as bladder stone, urinary tract stone and kidney stone. See 
the Oxford Stone Group’s brief history. (Oxford Stone Group 2018, n.p.) 
8 Cunningham’s views on cholera and contagion were proven at least partly correct by Robert Koch’s discovery of 
cholera’s bacterial source in the 1880s. 
9 Jon Cohen (2018, 148-50), writing in Science, gave some examples of the use of Frankenstein to celebrate new 
scientific discovery. His examples are actually uses of the prefix “Franken”, which is used with wider symbolism, 
often humorously. Specific reference to the novel and its main actors remains almost wholly negative in other 
media. 
10 The section on Frankenstein was almost always quoted directly when this article was summarised or reported in the 
popular press. See, for example, “Overcrowding the Medical Profession” (1899) and “Increase in Number of 
Medical Men” (1899). 
11 This example also uncovers the rich metaphors of Frankenstein that exist across the Anglophone scientific world. 
A further examination of Australian, or American or Canadian materials would clearly extend the work undertaken 
in this article, and while there is not time to develop more of it here, there are fruitful possibilities in doing so. 
